



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Weltbegriff und Erkenntnisbegriff. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung.
Von VIKTOR KRAFT. Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1912.—pp. 232.

This book is an interesting and instructive defense of realism. Its author tells us in the preface that he was driven to realism because of his conviction that the only alternative was subjectivism. No form of idealism or of positivism, so he came to believe, is free from the ultimate taint of solipsism. At the outset of the discussion, the contrast between the concept of nature and the concept of the self or of consciousness is set forth. The problem of their relation constitutes the task of winning an adequate *Weltbegriff*. The type of realism which the author defends is a dualistic realism. He contends that if you want a realism at all, you must also have a dualism. The reason for this is that what we immediately have before us in perception and in experience is always content of consciousness, whereas the real world of nature must be defined as wholly different from content of consciousness, unless indeed, one is willing to put up with subjectivism and solipsism. The author excludes the possibility of identifying immediate content of consciousness and objective reality, as the immanence philosophy, positivism, and epistemological monism attempt to do. He does not refer at all to the American movement of neo-realism, which has sought to free the immanence philosophy from subjectivism through the principles of external relations and multiple particularity.

The arguments which he uses to show that nothing immediately presented is ever objectively real are the familiar ones which idealism has used to discredit the naive realism of common sense. "Das objektive Körperliche ist immer nur begrifflich gedacht. Es ist nicht in der Wahrnehmung als Wirklichkeit 'gegeben,' . . . sondern es wird erkannt, erkennend konstituiert."¹ The natural, and in modern philosophy the usual, inference from this situation is the one drawn by idealism and positivism, *i. e.*, since no real object is ever immediately given, therefore all reality is immanent and is content of consciousness. But this is simply to make knowledge impossible, for knowledge demands a world independent of the knower. The author will have none of any metaphysical or absolute idealism; *Bewusstsein überhaupt* is as far in the direction of such metaphysics as he is willing to go,—and to stop here is to stop at positivism, and ultimately solipsism. The most interesting part of the discussion is the author's grounding of realism. You will have, he holds, no genuine realism until you seek to make rational all of your immediate experience. The principle of *Logizität* is the fundamental principle. This principle leads us to construct a theory as to the conditions which alone

¹ Page 93.

will explain our experience. Realism is such a theory, for it alone makes the order and relations of immediate experience intelligible. Realism is "eine erklärende Theorie der erlebten Wirklichkeit." The author insists that his realism is not the ordinary dualism of reality and its copy in consciousness; the relation is more complex. It is the relation between an abstract thought complex and a concretum which it intends and means. It appears to the reviewer very much as if, in developing the concept of this relationship, the dualism upon which so much earlier insistence was laid now broke down. It appears that the object is not merely represented in consciousness; it is actually presented to us, only *nicht anschaulich*. "Es ist uns (als objective räumliche Gestalt z. B.) auf diese Weise doch so, wie es ist, deutlich und vergegenwärtigt, wenn auch nicht anschaulich, wenn auch indirekt, diskursive zusammengesetzt, und wird nicht durch die Bewusstseinsgebilde der Erkenntnis bloss vertreten."¹

That there is a real world which must be presupposed if we are to make our immediate experience intelligible, has been said before, and by others than dualistic realists. That a critical idealism, no more than positivism—and we may also add, no more than neo-realism—can give us such a real world is here persuasively set forth. But that the "Other" of our immediate experience is so completely an Other as realistic dualism has implied is far from convincing. The author's demand for a dualistic realism is really a demand for a metaphysics; it is a discontent with the purely descriptive ideal of positivism, with the subjectivism of critical idealism, with any one-dimensional world of immediacy. And this demand also has made itself felt in idealism, but in an idealism scarcely recognized by this author. It is dismissed in a few words as something metaphysical and unscientific. As if, indeed, a dualistic realism, grounded on the principle of *Logizität*, were not itself *etwas metaphysisch!*

GEORGE P. ADAMS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

The Conception of a Kingdom of Ends in Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibniz.

By ELLA HARRISON STOKES. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1912.—pp. iv, 129.

In this monograph Miss Stokes has made a careful study of the doctrines of Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibniz with reference to the conception of the kingdom of ends, and a brief comparison of these doctrines with that of Kant. In the study of her problem she considers the general social and political situation that led up to the formulation of each of the three conceptions, and discusses the relation of each to its author's conceptions of the constitution of the universe and the nature of man and to his estimate of the value of the social and political institutions of his day.

Augustine's "City of God" shows an advance upon the Stoic conception in several respects: it takes account of man's emotional nature; it conceives the

¹ Page 225.